Knowledge, skill and virtue epistemology

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

According to virtue epistemology, one should primarily understand knowledge in terms of the relationship between cognitive success and cognitive agency. There are various ways of understanding this thesis. Along one axis, there is the debate about whether we should focus on the agent’s reliable cognitive skills in general, or whether we should instead treat knowledge as primarily concerned with the manifestation of more elevated epistemic standings, such as intellectual virtues. Along another axis, there is the debate about whether we should understand knowledge as being exclusively defined in terms of the subject’s cognitive skills (where this category includes the intellectual virtues), or whether there need to be supplementary conditions in one’s theory of knowledge to deal with the problem posed by knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. This chapter will explore these topics, and in the process offer an overview of the contemporary debate regarding issues at the nexus of knowledge, skill and virtue epistemology.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Routledge handbook of philosophy of skill and expertise
EditorsEllen Fridland, Carlotta Pavese
Place of PublicationLondon ; New York
PublisherRoutledge, Taylor and Francis Group
Chapter10
Pages135-145
Number of pages11
ISBN (Electronic)9781315180809
ISBN (Print)9780367533373
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021
Externally publishedYes

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