TY - JOUR
T1 - Legal responsibility adjudication and the normative authority of the mind sciences
AU - Vincent, Nicole A.
PY - 2011/9
Y1 - 2011/9
N2 - In the field of 'neurolaw', reformists claim that recent scientific discoveries from the mind sciences have serious ramifications for how legal responsibility should be adjudicated, but conservatives deny that this is so. In contrast, I criticise both of these polar opposite positions by arguing that although scientific findings can have often-weighty normative significance, they lack the normative authority with which reformists often imbue them. After explaining why conservatives and reformists are both wrong, I then offer my own moderate suggestions about what views we have reason to endorse. My moderate position reflects the familiar capacitarian idea which underlies much lay, legal, and philosophical thinking about responsibility-namely, that responsibility tracks mental capacity.
AB - In the field of 'neurolaw', reformists claim that recent scientific discoveries from the mind sciences have serious ramifications for how legal responsibility should be adjudicated, but conservatives deny that this is so. In contrast, I criticise both of these polar opposite positions by arguing that although scientific findings can have often-weighty normative significance, they lack the normative authority with which reformists often imbue them. After explaining why conservatives and reformists are both wrong, I then offer my own moderate suggestions about what views we have reason to endorse. My moderate position reflects the familiar capacitarian idea which underlies much lay, legal, and philosophical thinking about responsibility-namely, that responsibility tracks mental capacity.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=80052375354&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/13869795.2011.594937
DO - 10.1080/13869795.2011.594937
M3 - Article
VL - 14
SP - 315
EP - 331
JO - Philosophical Explorations
JF - Philosophical Explorations
SN - 1386-9795
IS - 3
ER -