Logical information and epistemic space

Mark Jago*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

15 Citations (Scopus)


Gaining information can be modelled as a narrowing of epistemic space. Intuitively, becoming informed that such-and-such is the case rules out certain scenarios or would-be possibilities. Chalmers's account of epistemic space treats it as a space of a priori possibility and so has trouble in dealing with the information which we intuitively feel can be gained from logical inference. I propose a more inclusive notion of epistemic space, based on Priest's notion of open worlds yet which contains only those epistemic scenarios which are not obviously impossible. Whether something is obvious is not always a determinate matter and so the resulting picture is of an epistemic space with fuzzy boundaries.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)327-341
Number of pages15
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2009


  • Epistemic possibility
  • Epistemic scenario
  • Epistemic space
  • Impossible worlds
  • Logical information
  • Open worlds
  • Rationality


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