Market niche, flexibility and commitment

Suren Basov*, Vladimir Smirnov, Andrew Wait

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We study a market-entry game in which the potential entrants wish to coordinate their actions (i.e. enter different market segments rather than compete directly). If (i) the firms have an option to wait, and (ii) each firm has a different reaction time after they have decided to wait, the unique outcome that survives the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies favors the less flexible firms.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)122-130
Number of pages9
JournalManchester School
Volume75
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2007

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