McKinsey paradoxes, radical scepticism, and the transmission of knowledge across known entailments

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

19 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A great deal of discussion in the recent literature has been devoted to the so-called 'McKinsey' paradox which purports to show that semantic externalism is incompatible with the sort of authoritative knowledge that we take ourselves to have of our own thought contents. In this paper I examine one influential epistemological response to this paradox which is due to Crispin Wright and Martin Davies. I argue that it fails to meet the challenge posed by McKinsey but that, if it is set within an externalist epistemology, it may have application to a related paradox that concerns the problem of radical scepticism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)279-302
Number of pages24
JournalSynthese
Volume130
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2002
Externally publishedYes

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