Mental time travel, agency and responsibility

Jeanette Kennett, Steve Matthews

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

We have argued elsewhere (2002) that moral responsibility over time depends in part upon the having of psychological connections which facilitate forms of self-control. In this chapter we explore the importance of mental time travel - our ordinary ability to mentally travel to temporal locations outside the present, involving both memory of our personal past and the ability to imagine ourselves in the future - to our agential capacities for planning and control. We suggest that in many individuals with dissociative disorders, forms of amnesia, or other frontal lobe damage, our capacity for mental time travel is impaired, resulting in commensurate losses to agency autonomy, and a forensic condition essential for holding persons responsible: in legal terms, the capacity for mens rea.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPsychiatry as cognitive neuroscience
Subtitle of host publicationphilosophical perspectives
EditorsMatthew R. Broome, Lisa Bortolotti
Place of PublicationOxford ; New York
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages327-350
Number of pages24
ISBN (Print)9780199238033
Publication statusPublished - 2009
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameInternational perspectives in philosophy and psychiatry
PublisherOxford University Press

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Kennett, J., & Matthews, S. (2009). Mental time travel, agency and responsibility. In M. R. Broome, & L. Bortolotti (Eds.), Psychiatry as cognitive neuroscience: philosophical perspectives (pp. 327-350). (International perspectives in philosophy and psychiatry). Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.