Abstract
Mental time travel is the ability to simulate alternative pasts and futures. It is often described as the ability to project a sense of self in the service of diachronic agency. It requires not only semantic representation but affective sampling of alternative futures. If people lose this ability for affective sampling their sense of self is diminished. They have less of a self to project hence are compromised as agents. If they cannot "feel the future" they cannot imaginatively inhabit it and hence their agency is compromised. The extent of such losses and consequent impairments to moral agency can be matters of degree.
| Language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages | 259-268 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | Mind |
| Volume | 126 |
| Issue number | 501 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2017 |
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Mental time travel, dynamic evaluation, and moral agency. / Gerrans, Philip; Kennett, Jeanette.
In: Mind, Vol. 126, No. 501, 01.01.2017, p. 259-268.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - Mental time travel, dynamic evaluation, and moral agency
AU - Gerrans, Philip
AU - Kennett, Jeanette
PY - 2017/1/1
Y1 - 2017/1/1
N2 - Mental time travel is the ability to simulate alternative pasts and futures. It is often described as the ability to project a sense of self in the service of diachronic agency. It requires not only semantic representation but affective sampling of alternative futures. If people lose this ability for affective sampling their sense of self is diminished. They have less of a self to project hence are compromised as agents. If they cannot "feel the future" they cannot imaginatively inhabit it and hence their agency is compromised. The extent of such losses and consequent impairments to moral agency can be matters of degree.
AB - Mental time travel is the ability to simulate alternative pasts and futures. It is often described as the ability to project a sense of self in the service of diachronic agency. It requires not only semantic representation but affective sampling of alternative futures. If people lose this ability for affective sampling their sense of self is diminished. They have less of a self to project hence are compromised as agents. If they cannot "feel the future" they cannot imaginatively inhabit it and hence their agency is compromised. The extent of such losses and consequent impairments to moral agency can be matters of degree.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85021068036&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1093/mind/fzv206
DO - 10.1093/mind/fzv206
M3 - Article
VL - 126
SP - 259
EP - 268
JO - Mind
T2 - Mind
JF - Mind
SN - 1460-2113
IS - 501
ER -