‘Mind as Feeling’ or Affective Relations? A Contribution to the School of Andersonian Realism

Simon Boag*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    12 Citations (Scopus)
    110 Downloads (Pure)

    Abstract

    Andersonian realism is a determinist, empiricist position that acknowledges the important distinction between qualities and relations. However, Anderson's ‘mind as feeling’ thesis, proposing that the mind's qualities are emotional, is problematic since it fails to account for ‘feelings’ themselves. O'Neil's (1934) alternative relational account of affects, in conjunction with Maze's (1983) theory of instinctual drives, provides a coherent platform for developing a comprehensive realist account of affects. In discussing the relation between affects, cognition and motivation, affects are viewed as drive-evaluative phenomena, and ‘feelings’ are known bodily states arising in conjunction with motivationally driven environmental evaluations. The role that affects play in a revised desire/belief model of behaviour explanation is discussed.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)505-525
    Number of pages21
    JournalTheory & Psychology
    Volume18
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2008

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