‘Mind as Feeling’ or Affective Relations?

A Contribution to the School of Andersonian Realism

Simon Boag*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

12 Citations (Scopus)
60 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Andersonian realism is a determinist, empiricist position that acknowledges the important distinction between qualities and relations. However, Anderson's ‘mind as feeling’ thesis, proposing that the mind's qualities are emotional, is problematic since it fails to account for ‘feelings’ themselves. O'Neil's (1934) alternative relational account of affects, in conjunction with Maze's (1983) theory of instinctual drives, provides a coherent platform for developing a comprehensive realist account of affects. In discussing the relation between affects, cognition and motivation, affects are viewed as drive-evaluative phenomena, and ‘feelings’ are known bodily states arising in conjunction with motivationally driven environmental evaluations. The role that affects play in a revised desire/belief model of behaviour explanation is discussed.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)505-525
Number of pages21
JournalTheory & Psychology
Volume18
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of '‘Mind as Feeling’ or Affective Relations? A Contribution to the School of Andersonian Realism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this