Misidentification delusions

Michael H. Connors*, Robyn Langdon, Max Coltheart

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

    9 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Misidentification delusions involve an incorrect belief about the identity of other people, oneself, animals, objects, or places. Examples include Capgras delusion (the belief that a person or animal has been replaced by a visually similar impostor), the delusion of inanimate doubles (the belief that objects have been replaced by replicas), and reduplicative paramnesia (the belief that a person or place has been duplicated). Although encompassing a wide range of different beliefs, misidentification delusions share two common elements: 1) a misidentified entity, and 2) an incorrect belief about the identity of that entity. Misidentification delusions can occur in many different clinical conditions. These include, for example, schizophrenia, dementia, affective disorders, stroke, and traumatic brain injury. This chapter reviews different types of misidentification delusions, examining the etiology and prevalence of misidentification delusions and offering a theoretical explanation based on Langdon and Coltheart's two-factor theory of delusions.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationTroublesome Disguises
    Subtitle of host publicationManaging Challenging Disorders in Psychiatry
    EditorsDinesh Bhugra, Gin S. Malhi
    Place of PublicationWest Sussex, UK
    PublisherWiley-Blackwell, Wiley
    Pages169-185
    Number of pages17
    Edition2nd
    ISBN (Electronic)9781118799574
    ISBN (Print)9781119993148
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 20 Jan 2015

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