Moral and epistemic luck

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

It is maintained that the arguments put forward by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in their widely influential exchange on the problem of moral luck are marred by a failure to (i) present a coherent understanding of what is involved in the notion of luck, and (ii) adequately distinguish between the problem of moral luck and the analogue problem of epistemic luck, especially that version of the problem that is traditionally presented by the epistemological sceptic. It is further claimed that once one offers a more developed notion of luck and disambiguates the problem of moral luck from the problem of epistemic luck (especially in its sceptical guise), neither of these papers is able to offer unambiguous grounds for thinking that there is a problem of moral luck. Indeed, it is shown that in so far as these papers succeed in making a prima facie case for the existence of epistemic luck, it is only the familiar sceptical variant of this problem that they identify.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-25
Number of pages25
JournalMetaphilosophy
Volume37
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2006
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Epistemology
  • Ethics
  • Luck
  • Scepticism

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