Abstract
Until recently, most philosophers seem implicitly to have assumed that consciousness is necessary for moral responsibility; this is, moreover, an assumption that seems built into the law. Under the pressure of scientific evidence and independent philosophical argument, some philosophers now reject that assumption. Against these philosophers, I argue that we need to be conscious of the facts that make our actions morally significant in order to be morally responsible for them. I present two separate defences of this claim. First, I argue that actions caused by unconscious attitudes do not express good or ill will toward others. Second, I argue that such actions do not express our evaluative agency. Finally, I turn to some alleged empirical evidence against the claim that we can be conscious of our volitions, and show how the defence offered is immune to this challenge.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Neuroscience and legal responsibility |
Editors | Nicole A Vincent |
Place of Publication | Oxford, UK |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 163-180 |
Number of pages | 18 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780199925605 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2013 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- consciousness
- moral responsibility
- reactive attitudes
- Libet
- law