Narrowing the scope of virtue epistemology

There are many aims virtue epistemologists may seek to pursue. Situationist critiques of virtue theoretical approaches notwithstanding, it is very plausible that individuals differ in the degree to which they possess the kinds of dispositions widely taken as sufficient to classify them as having or lacking particular epistemic virtues. Virtue epistemology, in its regulative guise, aims to improve cognition by inculcating epistemic virtues. Cassam argues that the epistemic costs of dogmatism are higher than its advocates think and its benefits much smaller than they think. Cassam concedes, nevertheless, that something in the ballpark of dogmatism is sometimes appropriate. Cassam’s arguments against dogmatism have three main elements: the costs of dogmatism, the behaviour of the scientist, and the benefits of confronting misleading evidence. Many neuroscientists who lack the specific expertise required to assess a claim within their general area can come to acquire it relatively rapidly.