Neuroethics: A new way of doing ethics

Neil Levy*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

57 Citations (Scopus)
34 Downloads (Pure)


The aim of this article is to argue, by example, for neuroethics as a new way of doing ethics. Rather than simply giving us a new subject matter-the ethical issues arising from neuroscience-to attend to, neuroethics offers us the opportunity to refine the tools we use. Ethicists often need to appeal to the intuitions provoked by consideration of cases to evaluate the permissibility of types of actions; data from the sciences of the mind give us reason to believe that some of these intuitions are less reliable than others. I focus on the doctrine of double effect to illustrate my case, arguing that experimental results suggest that appeal to it might be question-begging. The doctrine of double effect is supposed to show that there is a moral difference between effects that are brought about intentionally and those that are merely foreseen; I argue that the data suggest that we regard some effects asmerely foreseen only because we regard bringing them about as permissible. Appeal to the doctrine of double effect therefore cannot establish that there are such moral differences.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3-9
Number of pages7
JournalAJOB Neuroscience
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2011
Externally publishedYes

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