Could neuroimaging evidence help us to assess the degree of a person's responsibility for a crime which we know that they committed? This essay defends an affirmative answer to this question. A range of standard objections to this high-tech approach to assessing people's responsibility is considered and then set aside, but I also bring to light and then reject a novel objection-an objection which is only encountered when functional (rather than structural) neuroimaging is used to assess people's responsibility.
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- Automatic functions
- Capacitarian theory of responsibility
- Capacity responsibility
- Capacity-theoretic conception of responsibility
- Legal responsibility
- Mental capacity
- Modal fallacy
- Moral responsibility
- Roper v. Simmons 
- Theory to the best explanation