Abstract
The novice/expert problem is the problem of knowing which apparent expert to trust. Following Alvin Goldman’s lead, a number of philosophers have developed criteria that novices can use to distinguish more from less trustworthy experts. While the criteria the philosophers have identified are indeed useful in guiding expert choice, I argue, they can’t do the work that Goldman and his successors want from them: avoid a kind of testimonial scepticism. We can’t deploy them in the way needed to avoid such scepticism, because it would take genuine expertise to do so. I argue that attempts to deploy them in this sort of deep way involve a kind of transgression akin to, and at least as unreliable as, epistemic trespassing. We should give up trying to solve the novice/expert problem and instead promote better epistemic trust.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 2077-2094 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Journal | Erkenntnis |
| Volume | 90 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| Early online date | 8 Mar 2024 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jun 2025 |
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