Non-ideal epistemology and vices of attention

Neil Levy*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/opinionpeer-review

25 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

McKenna’s critique (rather than criticisms) of idealized approaches to epistemology is an important contribution to the literature. In this brief discussion, I set out his main concerns about more idealized approaches, within and beyond social epistemology, before turning to some issues I think he neglects. I suggest that it’s important to pay attention to the prestige hierarchy in philosophy, and to how that hierarchy can serve ideological purposes. The greater prestige of more abstract approaches plays a role in determining what issues and what voices we attend to.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)124-131
Number of pages8
JournalInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies
Volume32
Issue number1
Early online date1 Apr 2024
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2024

Bibliographical note

Copyright the Author(s) 2024. Version archived for private and non-commercial use with the permission of the author/s and according to publisher conditions. For further rights please contact the publisher.

Keywords

  • attention
  • ideal theory
  • ideology
  • prestige
  • social epistemology

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Non-ideal epistemology and vices of attention'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this