Non-ideal epistemology and vices of attention

Neil Levy*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalComment/opinionpeer-review

    1 Citation (Scopus)
    24 Downloads (Pure)

    Abstract

    McKenna’s critique (rather than criticisms) of idealized approaches to epistemology is an important contribution to the literature. In this brief discussion, I set out his main concerns about more idealized approaches, within and beyond social epistemology, before turning to some issues I think he neglects. I suggest that it’s important to pay attention to the prestige hierarchy in philosophy, and to how that hierarchy can serve ideological purposes. The greater prestige of more abstract approaches plays a role in determining what issues and what voices we attend to.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)124-131
    Number of pages8
    JournalInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies
    Volume32
    Issue number1
    Early online date1 Apr 2024
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2024

    Bibliographical note

    Copyright the Author(s) 2024. Version archived for private and non-commercial use with the permission of the author/s and according to publisher conditions. For further rights please contact the publisher.

    Keywords

    • attention
    • ideal theory
    • ideology
    • prestige
    • social epistemology

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