Nudges in a post-truth world

Neil Levy*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    44 Citations (Scopus)
    72 Downloads (Pure)

    Abstract

    Nudges-policy proposals informed by work in behavioural economics and psychology that are designed to lead to better decision-making or better behaviour- are controversial. Critics allege that they bypass our deliberative capacities, thereby undermining autonomy and responsible agency. In this paper, I identify a kind of nudge I call a nudge to reason, which make us more responsive to genuine evidence. I argue that at least some nudges to reason do not bypass our deliberative capacities. Instead, use of these nudges should be seen as appeals to mechanisms partially constitutive of these capacities, and therefore as benign (so far as autonomy and responsible agency are concerned). I sketch some concrete proposals for nudges to reason which are especially important given the apparent widespread resistance to evidence seen in recent political events.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)495-500
    Number of pages6
    JournalJournal of Medical Ethics
    Volume43
    Issue number8
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Aug 2017

    Bibliographical note

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