On 3-share threshold implementations for 4-bit s-boxes

Sebastian Kutzner, Phuong Ha Nguyen, Axel Poschmann, Huaxiong Wang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference proceeding contribution

20 Citations (Scopus)


One of the most promising lightweight hardware countermeasures against SCA attacks is the so-called Threshold Implementation (TI) [12] countermeasure. In this work we discuss issues towards its applicability and introduce solutions to boost its implementation efficiency. In particular, our contribution is three-fold: first we introduce two methodologies to efficiently implement 3-share TI to a given S-box. Second, as an example, we successfully apply these methodologies to PRESENT and are able to decrease the area requirements of its protected S-box by 37-40%. Third, we present the first successful practical Mutual Information Attack on the original 3-share TI implementation of PRESENT and compare it with a correlation-enhanced collision attack using second-order moments.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationConstructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - 4th International Workshop, COSADE 2013, Revised Selected Papers
Place of PublicationBerlin; Heidelberg
PublisherSpringer, Springer Nature
Number of pages15
Volume7864 LNCS
ISBN (Print)9783642400254
Publication statusPublished - 2013
Event4th Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design, COSADE 2013 - Paris, France
Duration: 6 Mar 20138 Mar 2013

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume7864 LNCS
ISSN (Print)03029743
ISSN (Electronic)16113349


Other4th Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design, COSADE 2013

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