Abstract
We obtain a lower bound on the linear complexity of the power generator of pseudo-random numbers, which in some special cases is also known as the RSA generator and as the Blum-Blum-Shub generator. In some very important cases this bound is essentially the best possible. In particular, this implies that lattice reduction attacks on such generators are not feasible.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 5-10 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| Journal | Designs, Codes and Cryptography |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2001 |
Keywords
- Blum-Blum-Shub generator
- Cryptography
- Linear complexity
- Power generator
- RSA generator