Abstract
Various authors debate the question of whether neuroscience is relevant to criminal responsibility. However, a plethora of different techniques and technologies, each with their own abilities and drawbacks, lurks beneath the label "neuroscience"; and in criminal law responsibility is not a single, unitary and generic concept, but it is rather a syndrome of at least six different concepts. Consequently, there are at least six different responsibility questions that the criminal law asks-at least one for each responsibility concept-and, I will suggest, a multitude of ways in which the techniques and technologies that comprise neuroscience might help us to address those diverse questions. In a way, on my account neuroscience is relevant to criminal responsibility in many ways, but I hesitate to state my position like this because doing so obscures two points which I would rather highlight: one, neither neuroscience nor criminal responsibility are as unified as that; and two, the criminal law asks many different responsibility questions and not just one generic question.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 77-98 |
Number of pages | 22 |
Journal | Criminal Law and Philosophy |
Volume | 4 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jan 2010 |
Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Copyright the Author(s) 2009. Version archived for private and non-commercial use with the permission of the author/s and according to publisher conditions. For further rights please contact the publisher.Keywords
- Criminal law
- Neurolaw
- Neuroscience
- Responsibility