Optimal commodity taxation with a representative agent

Murray C. Kemp; Koji Shimomura

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9361.2007.00405.x

Optimal commodity taxation with a representative agent

Murray C. Kemp, Koji Shimomura

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

It is argued that the task of describing the optimal vector of commodity taxes is trivialized by the traditional assumption of a price-taking representative agent; that, in particular, the assumption of a representative agent ensures that the null vector is optimal.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	385-389
Number of pages	5
Journal	Review of Development Economics
Volume	11
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2007.00405.x
Publication status	Published - 2007

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title = "Optimal commodity taxation with a representative agent",

abstract = "It is argued that the task of describing the optimal vector of commodity taxes is trivialized by the traditional assumption of a price-taking representative agent; that, in particular, the assumption of a representative agent ensures that the null vector is optimal.",

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Optimal commodity taxation with a representative agent

Abstract

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