Organization capital, tournament incentives and firm performance

Sabri  Boubaker; Mostafa Monzur Hasan; Ahsan Habib

doi:10.1016/j.frl.2021.102468

Organization capital, tournament incentives and firm performance

Sabri Boubaker, Mostafa Monzur Hasan, Ahsan Habib

Department of Accounting and Corporate Governance

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between organization capital and promotion-based tournament incentives. Using a sample of 33,618 publicly listed U.S. firm-year observations covering 1992–2020, the results show that firms with high levels of organization capital have relatively more promotion-based tournament incentives, and that tournament incentives in high organization capital firms improve firm value and operating performance.

Original language	English
Article number	102468
Journal	Finance Research Letters
Early online date	20 Sep 2021
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2021.102468
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 20 Sep 2021

Keywords

Agency costs
CEO compensation
Organizational capital
Tournament incentives

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10.1016/j.frl.2021.102468

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title = "Organization capital, tournament incentives and firm performance",

abstract = "This paper examines the relationship between organization capital and promotion-based tournament incentives. Using a sample of 33,618 publicly listed U.S. firm-year observations covering 1992–2020, the results show that firms with high levels of organization capital have relatively more promotion-based tournament incentives, and that tournament incentives in high organization capital firms improve firm value and operating performance.",

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AB - This paper examines the relationship between organization capital and promotion-based tournament incentives. Using a sample of 33,618 publicly listed U.S. firm-year observations covering 1992–2020, the results show that firms with high levels of organization capital have relatively more promotion-based tournament incentives, and that tournament incentives in high organization capital firms improve firm value and operating performance.

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KW - Tournament incentives

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Organization capital, tournament incentives and firm performance

Abstract

Keywords

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