Organization capital, tournament incentives and firm performance

Sabri  Boubaker; Mostafa Monzur Hasan; Ahsan Habib

doi:10.1016/j.frl.2021.102468

Organization capital, tournament incentives and firm performance

Sabri Boubaker, Mostafa Monzur Hasan, Ahsan Habib

Department of Accounting and Corporate Governance

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between organization capital and promotion-based tournament incentives. Using a sample of 33,618 publicly listed U.S. firm-year observations covering 1992–2020, the results show that firms with high levels of organization capital have relatively more promotion-based tournament incentives, and that tournament incentives in high organization capital firms improve firm value and operating performance.

Original language	English
Article number	102468
Pages (from-to)	1-8
Number of pages	8
Journal	Finance Research Letters
Volume	46
Issue number	Part B
Early online date	20 Sep 2021
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2021.102468
Publication status	Published - May 2022

Keywords

Agency costs
CEO compensation
Organizational capital
Tournament incentives

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10.1016/j.frl.2021.102468

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abstract = "This paper examines the relationship between organization capital and promotion-based tournament incentives. Using a sample of 33,618 publicly listed U.S. firm-year observations covering 1992–2020, the results show that firms with high levels of organization capital have relatively more promotion-based tournament incentives, and that tournament incentives in high organization capital firms improve firm value and operating performance.",

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Organization capital, tournament incentives and firm performance

Abstract

Keywords

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