Abstract
Frédérique de Vignemont argues on the basis of several empirical counterexamples that Bain and Klein are wrong about the relationship between pain and bodily care. I argue that the force of the putative counterexamples is weak. Properly understood, the association between pain and care is preserved in a way that is consistent with both de Vignemont's own views and the empirical facts.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 588-593 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| Journal | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
| Volume | 95 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 14 Jul 2017 |
Keywords
- pain
- pain asymbolia
- bodily representation
- bodily care
- somatoparaphrenia