Passive blockholders, informational efficiency of prices, and firm value

Kee H. Chung, Choonsik Lee, Carl Hsin-han Shen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper analyzes the role of passive blockholders in corporate governance using data on Schedule 13G filings. We show that firm value increases with the number and aggregate ownership of passive blockholders after controlling for other possible determinants of firm value. More importantly, we show that the informational efficiency of prices (IEP) increases with the number and aggregate ownership of passive blockholders, and IEP is a channel through which passive blockholders affect firm value. Overall, our results suggest that managers perform better when stock prices reflect the economic consequences of their actions promptly and accurately through information‐based trading of blockholders.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)494-512
Number of pages19
JournalReview of Financial Economics
Volume38
Issue number3
Early online date23 Oct 2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2020

Keywords

  • Tobin's q ratio
  • causal mediation analysis
  • informational efficiency of asset price
  • liquidity
  • passive blockholders

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