Peirce's final account of signs and the philosophy of language

Albert Atkin*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

    18 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    In this paper I examine parallels between C.S. Peirce's most mature account of signs and contemporary philosophy of language. I do this by first introducing a summary of Peirce's final account of Signs. I then use that account of signs to reconstruct Peircian answers to two puzzles of reference: The Problem of Cognitive Significance, or Frege's Puzzle; and The Same-Saying Phenomenon for Indexicals. Finally, a comparison of these Peircian answers with both Fregean and Direct Referentialist approaches to the puzzles highlights interesting parallels and important differences between Peirce's final account of signs, and the concepts used in analytic philosophy of language.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)63-85
    Number of pages23
    JournalTransactions of the Charles S Peirce Society
    Volume44
    Issue number1
    Publication statusPublished - 2008

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