Peirce's final account of signs and the philosophy of language

Albert Atkin*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper I examine parallels between C.S. Peirce's most mature account of signs and contemporary philosophy of language. I do this by first introducing a summary of Peirce's final account of Signs. I then use that account of signs to reconstruct Peircian answers to two puzzles of reference: The Problem of Cognitive Significance, or Frege's Puzzle; and The Same-Saying Phenomenon for Indexicals. Finally, a comparison of these Peircian answers with both Fregean and Direct Referentialist approaches to the puzzles highlights interesting parallels and important differences between Peirce's final account of signs, and the concepts used in analytic philosophy of language.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)63-85
Number of pages23
JournalTransactions of the Charles S Peirce Society
Volume44
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Peirce's final account of signs and the philosophy of language'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this