Abstract
In this paper I examine parallels between C.S. Peirce's most mature account of signs and contemporary philosophy of language. I do this by first introducing a summary of Peirce's final account of Signs. I then use that account of signs to reconstruct Peircian answers to two puzzles of reference: The Problem of Cognitive Significance, or Frege's Puzzle; and The Same-Saying Phenomenon for Indexicals. Finally, a comparison of these Peircian answers with both Fregean and Direct Referentialist approaches to the puzzles highlights interesting parallels and important differences between Peirce's final account of signs, and the concepts used in analytic philosophy of language.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 63-85 |
| Number of pages | 23 |
| Journal | Transactions of the Charles S Peirce Society |
| Volume | 44 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - 2008 |