Perception and the reach of phenomenal content

Tim Bayne

doi:10.1002/9781444343915.ch2

Perception and the reach of phenomenal content

Tim Bayne^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Summary: The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high-level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say 'No', whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say 'Yes'. I clarify the debate between conservatives and liberals, and argue in favour of the liberal view that high-level content can directly inform the phenomenal character of perception.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	The admissible contents of experience
Editors	Fiona Macpherson, Katherine Hawley
Place of Publication	Malden, Massachusetts; Chichester, West Sussex, UK
Publisher	John Wiley & Sons
Pages	16-35
Number of pages	20
ISBN (Print)	9781444333350
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444343915.ch2
Publication status	Published - 14 Oct 2011
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Previously published in The Philosophical Quarterly, 59(236), 2009, Pp. 385–404, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.631.x

Keywords

perceptual experience
phenomenal properties
visual experience
perceptual phenomenality
high-level content

Access to Document

10.1002/9781444343915.ch2

Cite this

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AB - Summary: The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high-level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say 'No', whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say 'Yes'. I clarify the debate between conservatives and liberals, and argue in favour of the liberal view that high-level content can directly inform the phenomenal character of perception.

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ER -

Perception and the reach of phenomenal content

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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