Perception and the reach of phenomenal content

Tim Bayne*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


Summary: The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high-level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say 'No', whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say 'Yes'. I clarify the debate between conservatives and liberals, and argue in favour of the liberal view that high-level content can directly inform the phenomenal character of perception.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe admissible contents of experience
EditorsFiona Macpherson, Katherine Hawley
Place of PublicationMalden, Massachusetts; Chichester, West Sussex, UK
PublisherJohn Wiley & Sons
Number of pages20
ISBN (Print)9781444333350
Publication statusPublished - 14 Oct 2011
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Previously published in The Philosophical Quarterly, 59(236), 2009, Pp. 385–404,


  • perceptual experience
  • phenomenal properties
  • visual experience
  • perceptual phenomenality
  • high-level content


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