Performance evaluation of Quantum-secure symmetric key agreement

Quantum-safe public key exchange protocols face significant challenges in hardware- and software-based approaches. Quantum key distribution, which relies on specialized quantum hardware, presents a significant barrier to widespread adoption due to its high cost and limited scalability. Conversely, software-based solutions using post-quantum algorithms introduce complications, such as increased resource demands and larger cipher-texts. Furthermore, the security of these post-quantum algorithms remains relatively untested, which has led to the emerging trend of hybrid deployment, combining clas-sical and quantum-resistant techniques to hedge against potential vulnerabilities. Recently, Arqit proposed a quantum-secure symmet-ric key agreement (SKA) protocol, claiming that it is lightweight and scalable [1] to address these problems. However, their proprietary solution is not available for independent analysis. To evaluate the performance and scalability of quantum-secure SKA techniques, we develop variations of the SKA protocol using open-source and accessible components in this work. To analyze quantum-secure SKA scheme, we imple-mented an SKA technique that involves a hybrid mech-anism, leveraging secret strings distributed through a combination of existing classical and quantum public key pairs during the initial key exchange. We analyze our scheme and demonstrate that it incurs minimal performance overhead, with only 99ms for purely quantum SKA and 199ms for the hybrid version, compared to the classical SKA protocol. We also show that our scheme remains robust under various network conditions, including delays, packet losses, and bandwidth variations, maintaining small and consistent overheads. We also show that this solution is scalable, with an overhead of only one second for every additional five concurrent users. This performance improves significantly with increased computational resources-achieving a 50-60% improvement when scaling from two to four CPUs. Additionally, our security evaluations confirm that the protocol provides consistent and sufficient randomness throughout the key agreement process, ensuring quantum-resistance at every stage.