TY - JOUR
T1 - Personal identity, the causal condition, and the simple view
AU - Matthews, Steve
PY - 2010/7
Y1 - 2010/7
N2 - Among theories of personal identity over time, the simple view has not been popular among philosophers, but it nevertheless remains the default view among non-philosophers. It may be construed either as the view that nothing grounds a claim of personal identity over time, or that something quite simple (a soul perhaps) is the ground. If the former construal is accepted, a conspicuous difficulty is that the condition of causal dependence between person-stages is absent. But this leaves such a view open to an objection from the failure to provide a condition of individuation. If, on the other hand something like a soul is said to ground personal identity over time, such an account turns out to be more suited to a kind of continuity view.
AB - Among theories of personal identity over time, the simple view has not been popular among philosophers, but it nevertheless remains the default view among non-philosophers. It may be construed either as the view that nothing grounds a claim of personal identity over time, or that something quite simple (a soul perhaps) is the ground. If the former construal is accepted, a conspicuous difficulty is that the condition of causal dependence between person-stages is absent. But this leaves such a view open to an objection from the failure to provide a condition of individuation. If, on the other hand something like a soul is said to ground personal identity over time, such an account turns out to be more suited to a kind of continuity view.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=79957926107&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/05568641.2010.503449
DO - 10.1080/05568641.2010.503449
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:79957926107
VL - 39
SP - 183
EP - 208
JO - Philosophical Papers
JF - Philosophical Papers
SN - 0556-8641
IS - 2
ER -