Abstract
RFID technology has become popular in many applications; however, most of the RFID products lack security related functionality due to the hardware limitation of the low-cost RFID tags. In 2009, Chien and Laih proposed an RFID authentication protocol based on error correction codes (ECC) to secure RFID systems with untraceability, which is one of the most critical privacy issues on RFID. In this paper, we demonstrate that their scheme is insecure against two kinds of tracing attacks. We also analyze the success probability of our attacks.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 642-648 |
Number of pages | 7 |
Journal | Journal of Information Hiding and Multimedia Signal Processing |
Volume | 5 |
Issue number | 4 |
Publication status | Published - 1 Oct 2014 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Error correction code
- Privacy
- RFID
- Security