Platitudes and Counterexamples

Peter Menzies

doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.003.0018

Platitudes and Counterexamples

Peter Menzies^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

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2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This article explains the conception of causation as a natural relation in more detail. It outlines some of the features of our use of the causal concept that do not fit with the idea of causation as a natural relation between events. It then outlines the correct explanation of these features, replacing the metaphysical conception of causation with a conception of causation in terms of a contrastive difference-making relation, where the contrasts are determined contextually on the basis of what are often normative considerations.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	The Oxford Handbook of Causation
Publisher	Oxford University Press
Pages	341-367
Number of pages	27
ISBN (Electronic)	9780191577246
ISBN (Print)	9780199279739
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.003.0018
Publication status	Published - 2 Jan 2010

Keywords

Causal concept
Conception of causation
Counterexamples
Natural relation
Normative considerations
Platitudes

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10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.003.0018

Cite this

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Platitudes and Counterexamples

Abstract

Keywords

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