Abstract
This article explains the conception of causation as a natural relation in more detail. It outlines some of the features of our use of the causal concept that do not fit with the idea of causation as a natural relation between events. It then outlines the correct explanation of these features, replacing the metaphysical conception of causation with a conception of causation in terms of a contrastive difference-making relation, where the contrasts are determined contextually on the basis of what are often normative considerations.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The Oxford Handbook of Causation |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 341-367 |
Number of pages | 27 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191577246 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780199279739 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2 Jan 2010 |
Keywords
- Causal concept
- Conception of causation
- Counterexamples
- Natural relation
- Normative considerations
- Platitudes