Privileged access revisited

Jordi Fernández

doi:10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00389.x

Privileged access revisited

Jordi Fernández

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Aaron Zimmerman has recently raised an interesting objection to an account of self-knowledge I have offered. The objection has the form of a dilemma: either it is possible for us to be entitled to beliefs which we do not form, or it is not. If it is, the conditions for introspective justification within the model I advocate are insufficient. If not, they are otiose. I challenge Zimmerman's defence of the first horn of the dilemma.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	102-105
Number of pages	4
Journal	The Philosophical Quarterly
Volume	55
Issue number	218
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00389.x
Publication status	Published - 2005

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10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00389.x

Cite this

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title = "Privileged access revisited",

abstract = "Aaron Zimmerman has recently raised an interesting objection to an account of self-knowledge I have offered. The objection has the form of a dilemma: either it is possible for us to be entitled to beliefs which we do not form, or it is not. If it is, the conditions for introspective justification within the model I advocate are insufficient. If not, they are otiose. I challenge Zimmerman's defence of the first horn of the dilemma.",

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AB - Aaron Zimmerman has recently raised an interesting objection to an account of self-knowledge I have offered. The objection has the form of a dilemma: either it is possible for us to be entitled to beliefs which we do not form, or it is not. If it is, the conditions for introspective justification within the model I advocate are insufficient. If not, they are otiose. I challenge Zimmerman's defence of the first horn of the dilemma.

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