Provably secure three-party key agreement protocol using Chebyshev chaotic maps in the standard model

Hong Lai*, Mehmet A. Orgun, Jinghua Xiao, Josef Pieprzyk, Liyin Xue, Yixian Yang

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

28 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Recently, several key agreement protocols based on Chebyshev chaotic maps have been proposed in the literature. However, they can normally achieve "heuristic" security, that is, once drawbacks are found in these protocols, they are either modified to resist the new attacks, or are discarded. Under these circumstances, it is necessary and significant to define standard security models that can precisely characterize the capabilities of the participants and a potent adversary. Hence, we propose to use public key encryption based on enhanced Chebyshev chaotic maps and pseudo-random function ensembles to construct an efficient three-party key agreement protocol under the standard model, in which the adversary is able to make a wider range of queries and have more freedom than the other proposed schemes. In the design of our protocol, we follow the ideas in the recent key agreement protocol of Yang and Cao's. The proposed protocol is shown to be provably secure if decisional Diffie-Hellman problem, which is based on Chebyshev chaotic maps, is computationally infeasible. To the best of our knowledge, our protocol is the first provably secure 3PAKE protocol using Chebyshev chaotic maps under the standard model.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1427-1439
Number of pages13
JournalNonlinear Dynamics
Volume77
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2014

Keywords

  • Decisional Diffie-Hellman
  • Enhanced Chebyshev chaotic maps
  • Heuristic security
  • Pseudo-random function ensembles
  • Standard model

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Provably secure three-party key agreement protocol using Chebyshev chaotic maps in the standard model'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this