This chapter aims to expand the body of empirical literature considered relevant to virtue theory beyond the burned-over districts that are the situationist challenges to virtue ethics and epistemology. It argues for the importance of an interactionist framework in bringing psychological research in general, and intelligence research in particular, to bear on questions of virtue. The chapter discusses the history and present state of intelligence research and argue for its relevance to virtue epistemology. It also argues that intelligence sits uneasily in both responsibilist and reliabilist virtue frameworks, which suggests that a new approach to virtueepistemology is needed. Intelligence is probably the best-documented disposition in all of personality psychology. Furthermore, to say that intelligence is an intellectual virtue borders on analyticity. One natural answer is that all measures of intelligence tap aspects of the same general ability. The chapter concludes by placing intelligence within a new interactionist framework.
|Title of host publication||Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology|
|Place of Publication||New York ; London|
|Publisher||Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group|
|Number of pages||13|
|Publication status||Published - 2019|
|Name||Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy|
Skorburg, J. A., & Alfano, M. (2019). Psychological science and virtue epistemology: intelligence as an interactionist virtue. In H. Battaly (Ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology (pp. 433-445). (Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy). New York ; London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315712550-36