Psychological science and virtue epistemology: intelligence as an interactionist virtue

Joshua August Skorburg*, Mark Alfano

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


This chapter aims to expand the body of empirical literature considered relevant to virtue theory beyond the burned-over districts that are the situationist challenges to virtue ethics and epistemology. It argues for the importance of an interactionist framework in bringing psychological research in general, and intelligence research in particular, to bear on questions of virtue. The chapter discusses the history and present state of intelligence research and argue for its relevance to virtue epistemology. It also argues that intelligence sits uneasily in both responsibilist and reliabilist virtue frameworks, which suggests that a new approach to virtueepistemology is needed. Intelligence is probably the best-documented disposition in all of personality psychology. Furthermore, to say that intelligence is an intellectual virtue borders on analyticity. One natural answer is that all measures of intelligence tap aspects of the same general ability. The chapter concludes by placing intelligence within a new interactionist framework.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationRoutledge handbook of virtue epistemology
EditorsHeather Battaly
Place of PublicationNew York ; London
PublisherRoutledge, Taylor and Francis Group
Number of pages13
ISBN (Electronic)9781315712550
ISBN (Print)9781138890206
Publication statusPublished - 2019
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameRoutledge Handbooks in Philosophy

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