Random access games: selfish nodes with incomplete information

Hazer Inaltekin; Stephen B. Wicker

doi:10.1109/MILCOM.2007.4455080

Random access games: selfish nodes with incomplete information

Hazer Inaltekin^*, Stephen B. Wicker

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference proceeding contribution › peer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyze the behavior of selfish sensor nodes when they have uncertainties and incomplete information about one another. We consider a network of such selfish nodes contending for the access of a common wireless communication channel. In this scenario, sensor platforms have only subjective belief distributions about the pay-off functions of their opponents. We characterize the set of all pure strategy Nash equilibria under incomplete information for such selfish sensors. A monotonicity property for the Nash equilibrium strategies is identified. That is, there exists a critical cut-off threshold c* such that if the cost of the collision is smaller than c ^‡, sensors transmit. Otherwise, backing-off becomes more beneficial for them. For the uniformly and exponentially distributed beliefs, we also pinpoint the location of this critical cut-off threshold.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	MILCOM 2007 - IEEE Military Communications Conference
Place of Publication	Piscataway, NJ
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Electronic)	9781424415137
ISBN (Print)	9781424415120
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/MILCOM.2007.4455080
Publication status	Published - 2007
Externally published	Yes
Event	Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2007 - Orlando, FL, United States Duration: 29 Oct 2007 → 31 Oct 2007

Publication series

Name
ISSN (Print)	2155-7578
ISSN (Electronic)	2155-7586

Conference

Conference	Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2007
Country/Territory	United States
City	Orlando, FL
Period	29/10/07 → 31/10/07

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10.1109/MILCOM.2007.4455080

Cite this

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title = "Random access games: selfish nodes with incomplete information",

abstract = "We analyze the behavior of selfish sensor nodes when they have uncertainties and incomplete information about one another. We consider a network of such selfish nodes contending for the access of a common wireless communication channel. In this scenario, sensor platforms have only subjective belief distributions about the pay-off functions of their opponents. We characterize the set of all pure strategy Nash equilibria under incomplete information for such selfish sensors. A monotonicity property for the Nash equilibrium strategies is identified. That is, there exists a critical cut-off threshold c* such that if the cost of the collision is smaller than c ‡, sensors transmit. Otherwise, backing-off becomes more beneficial for them. For the uniformly and exponentially distributed beliefs, we also pinpoint the location of this critical cut-off threshold.",

author = "Hazer Inaltekin and Wicker, {Stephen B.}",

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language = "English",

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T2 - Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2007

AU - Inaltekin, Hazer

AU - Wicker, Stephen B.

PY - 2007

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N2 - We analyze the behavior of selfish sensor nodes when they have uncertainties and incomplete information about one another. We consider a network of such selfish nodes contending for the access of a common wireless communication channel. In this scenario, sensor platforms have only subjective belief distributions about the pay-off functions of their opponents. We characterize the set of all pure strategy Nash equilibria under incomplete information for such selfish sensors. A monotonicity property for the Nash equilibrium strategies is identified. That is, there exists a critical cut-off threshold c* such that if the cost of the collision is smaller than c ‡, sensors transmit. Otherwise, backing-off becomes more beneficial for them. For the uniformly and exponentially distributed beliefs, we also pinpoint the location of this critical cut-off threshold.

AB - We analyze the behavior of selfish sensor nodes when they have uncertainties and incomplete information about one another. We consider a network of such selfish nodes contending for the access of a common wireless communication channel. In this scenario, sensor platforms have only subjective belief distributions about the pay-off functions of their opponents. We characterize the set of all pure strategy Nash equilibria under incomplete information for such selfish sensors. A monotonicity property for the Nash equilibrium strategies is identified. That is, there exists a critical cut-off threshold c* such that if the cost of the collision is smaller than c ‡, sensors transmit. Otherwise, backing-off becomes more beneficial for them. For the uniformly and exponentially distributed beliefs, we also pinpoint the location of this critical cut-off threshold.

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DO - 10.1109/MILCOM.2007.4455080

M3 - Conference proceeding contribution

AN - SCOPUS:47949124003

SN - 9781424415120

BT - MILCOM 2007 - IEEE Military Communications Conference

PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)

CY - Piscataway, NJ

Y2 - 29 October 2007 through 31 October 2007

ER -

Random access games: selfish nodes with incomplete information

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