Random access games: selfish nodes with incomplete information

Hazer Inaltekin*, Stephen B. Wicker

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference proceeding contributionpeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyze the behavior of selfish sensor nodes when they have uncertainties and incomplete information about one another. We consider a network of such selfish nodes contending for the access of a common wireless communication channel. In this scenario, sensor platforms have only subjective belief distributions about the pay-off functions of their opponents. We characterize the set of all pure strategy Nash equilibria under incomplete information for such selfish sensors. A monotonicity property for the Nash equilibrium strategies is identified. That is, there exists a critical cut-off threshold c* such that if the cost of the collision is smaller than c , sensors transmit. Otherwise, backing-off becomes more beneficial for them. For the uniformly and exponentially distributed beliefs, we also pinpoint the location of this critical cut-off threshold.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationMILCOM 2007 - IEEE Military Communications Conference
Place of PublicationPiscataway, NJ
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781424415137
ISBN (Print)9781424415120
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2007
Externally publishedYes
EventMilitary Communications Conference, MILCOM 2007 - Orlando, FL, United States
Duration: 29 Oct 200731 Oct 2007

Publication series

Name
ISSN (Print)2155-7578
ISSN (Electronic)2155-7586

Conference

ConferenceMilitary Communications Conference, MILCOM 2007
CountryUnited States
CityOrlando, FL
Period29/10/0731/10/07

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