Real attacks on virtual networks: Vivaldi out of tune

Mohamed Ali Kaafar*, Laurent Mathy, Thierry Turletti, Walid Dabbous

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference proceeding contributionpeer-review

28 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The recently proposed coordinates-based systems for network positioning have been shown to be accurate, with very low distance prediction error. However, these systems often rely on nodes coordination and assume that information reported by probed nodes is correct. In this paper, we identify different attacks against coordinates embedding systems and study the impact of such attacks on the recently proposed Vivaldi decentralized positioning system. We present a simulation study of attacks carried out by malicious nodes that provide biased coordinates information and delay measurement probes. We experiment with attack strategies that aim to (i) introduce disorder in the system, (ii) fool honest nodes to move far away from their correct positions and (iii) isolate a particular node in the system through collusion. Our findings confirm the susceptibility of the Vivaldi System to such attacks.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2006 SIGCOMM Workshop on Large-scale Attack Defense, LSAD'06
Pages139-146
Number of pages8
Volume2006
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2006
Externally publishedYes
EventACM SIGCOMM 2006 - Conference on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication - Pisa, Italy
Duration: 11 Sept 200615 Sept 2006

Conference

ConferenceACM SIGCOMM 2006 - Conference on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication
Country/TerritoryItaly
CityPisa
Period11/09/0615/09/06

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Real attacks on virtual networks: Vivaldi out of tune'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this