Reasons-based moral judgment and the erotetic theory

Philipp Koralus, Mark Alfano

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We argue that moral decision making is reasons-based, focusing on the idea that people encounter decisions as questions to be answered and that they process reasons to the extent that they can see them as putative answers to those questions. After introducing our topic, we sketch the erotetic reasons-based framework for decision making. We then describe three experiments that extend this framework to moral decision making in different question frames, cast doubt on theories of moral decision making that discount reasons and appeal, and replicate our initial finds in moral contexts that do not involve direct physical harm. We conclude by reinterpreting Stanley Milgram’s studies in destructive obedience in our new framework.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationMoral inferences
EditorsJean-François Bonnefon, Bastien Trémolière
Place of PublicationLondon ; New York
PublisherRoutledge, Taylor and Francis Group
Pages77-106
Number of pages30
ISBN (Electronic)9781317383840
ISBN (Print)9781138937970, 9781138937987
Publication statusPublished - 2017
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Reasons-based moral judgment and the erotetic theory'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this

    Koralus, P., & Alfano, M. (2017). Reasons-based moral judgment and the erotetic theory. In J-F. Bonnefon, & B. Trémolière (Eds.), Moral inferences (pp. 77-106). London ; New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.