Recognitive freedom

Hegel and the problem of recognition

Robert Sinnerbrink*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper examines the theme of recognition in Hegel's account of self-consciousness, suggesting that there are unresolved difficulties with the relationship between the normative sense of mutual recognition and phenomenological cases of unequal recognition. Recent readings of Hegel deal with this problem by positing an implicit distinction between an 'ontological' sense of recognition as a precondition for autonomous subjectivity, and a 'normative' sense of recognition as embodied in rational social and political institutions. Drawing on recent work by Robert Pippin and Axel Honneth, I argue that Hegel's conception of rational freedom provides the key to grasping the relationship between the ontological and normative senses of recognition. Recognitive freedom provides a way of appropriating Hegel's theory of recognition for contemporary social philosophy.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)271-295
Number of pages25
JournalCritical Horizons
Volume5
Publication statusPublished - 2004

    Fingerprint

Keywords

  • Intersubjectivity hegel
  • Rational freedom
  • Recognition
  • Social philosophy

Cite this