Regulating judges, Japanese-style: the prevalence of informal mechanisms

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

In Japan the interaction between institutional and informal mechanisms results in a de facto regulatory regime for judges. This contributes to judicial conservatism in politically sensitive cases and deviation from the underpinning values (such as judicial independence, impartiality and representativeness) of the foreign-influenced de jure regulatory regime that was established during the post-war Allied Occupation. But the public does not expect such values. Judicial conservatism has not caused public dissatisfaction or lack of confidence in the judiciary. At the same time, interference from the executive government is unlikely. Therefore, without a change in the public’s ideology, judicial conservatism in Japan will continue unabated.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationRegulating judges
Subtitle of host publicationbeyond independence and accountability
EditorsRichard Devlin, Adam Dodek
Place of PublicationCheltenham
PublisherEdward Elgar Publishing
Pages262-278
Number of pages17
ISBN (Print)9781786430793
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016

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