Internalist theories of relational autonomy specify conditions for autonomy that are wholly internal to agents’ psychologies. Externalist theories claim that internal conditions are insufficient to explain the autonomy-impairing effects of social oppression. Autonomy requires, in addition, equality of socio-relational status. Social relations and social structures characterized by domination, oppression, and status inequality, and that convey messages of disrespect and inferiority, impair the autonomy of individual members of subordinated or marginalized social groups. Externalist theories thus seem to be appealing to relational egalitarian intuitions. However, the debate between internalist and externalist theories of relational autonomy has proceeded without much reference to the literature in normative political philosophy on relational equality. My aim in this chapter is first to show that mapping the conceptual connections between externalist theories and the claims of relational egalitarianism helps to clarify what is at stake in the debate between internalist and externalist theories of relational autonomy. It also helps to clarify the importance of autonomy in relational egalitarian theory. Second, I will argue that by using the conceptual resources of relational egalitarianism, externalist theories are better able to respond to some of the standard objections against them, namely, that they run the risk of disrespecting the agency of persons subject to social oppression and inviting paternalistic interventions into their lives.