Relational mentalizing after any representation

Eliane Deschrijver*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/opinion

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Autistic, developmental, and nonhuman primate populations fail tasks that are thought to involve attributing beliefs, but not those thought to reflect the representation of knowledge. Instead of knowledge representations being more basic than belief representations, relational mentalizing may explain these observations: The tasks referred to as reflecting "belief" representation, but not the "knowledge" representation tasks, are social conflict designs. They involve mental conflict monitoring after another's mental state is represented - with effects that need to be accounted for.

Original languageEnglish
Article numbere148
Pages (from-to)27-29
Number of pages3
JournalBehavioral and Brain Sciences
Volume44
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 19 Nov 2021
Externally publishedYes

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