Relativism and self-refutation

FJ Hibberd

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

The claim that social constractionism embodies the doctrine of relativism remains the primary objection to constructionist metatheory (e.g., Brewster Smith, 1994; Bunge, 1993; Burr, 1998; Cerullo, 1992; Chow, 1995; Cromby & Nightingale, 1999; Danziger, 1997; Foster, 1987; Greenwood, 1994; Hailing & Lawrence, 1999; Harre & Krausz, 1996; Held, 1998; Liebrucks, 2001; Matthews, 1998; McMullen, 1996; Parker, 1999; Terwee, 1995). Relativism has been variously castigated as: a type of intellectual mischief which presents a special dilemma (Cerullo, 1992); paradoxical (Matthews, 1998); unintelligible (Greenwood, 1989); logically inconsistent (Foster, 1987); self-refuting (Harre, 1992; Kukla, 2000; Terwee, 1995), self-contradictory (Hailing & Lawrence, 1999; Maze, 2001), incoherent (Harre, 1992), and philosophically anarchistic (Harre & Krausz, 1996).
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationUnfolding social constructionism
EditorsMan Cheung Chung
Place of PublicationNew York, USA
PublisherSpringer, Springer Nature
Pages29-54
Number of pages26
ISBN (Print)978-0-387-22975-1
Publication statusPublished - 2005
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameHistory and Philosophy of Psychology
PublisherSPRINGER

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