TY - CHAP
T1 - Relativism and self-refutation
AU - Hibberd, FJ
PY - 2005
Y1 - 2005
N2 - The claim that social constractionism embodies the doctrine of relativism remains the primary objection to constructionist metatheory (e.g., Brewster Smith, 1994; Bunge, 1993; Burr, 1998; Cerullo, 1992; Chow, 1995; Cromby & Nightingale, 1999; Danziger, 1997; Foster, 1987; Greenwood, 1994; Hailing & Lawrence, 1999; Harre & Krausz, 1996; Held, 1998; Liebrucks, 2001; Matthews, 1998; McMullen, 1996; Parker, 1999; Terwee, 1995). Relativism has been variously castigated as: a type of intellectual mischief which presents a special dilemma (Cerullo, 1992); paradoxical (Matthews, 1998); unintelligible (Greenwood, 1989); logically inconsistent (Foster, 1987); self-refuting (Harre, 1992; Kukla, 2000; Terwee, 1995), self-contradictory (Hailing & Lawrence, 1999; Maze, 2001), incoherent (Harre, 1992), and philosophically anarchistic (Harre & Krausz, 1996).
AB - The claim that social constractionism embodies the doctrine of relativism remains the primary objection to constructionist metatheory (e.g., Brewster Smith, 1994; Bunge, 1993; Burr, 1998; Cerullo, 1992; Chow, 1995; Cromby & Nightingale, 1999; Danziger, 1997; Foster, 1987; Greenwood, 1994; Hailing & Lawrence, 1999; Harre & Krausz, 1996; Held, 1998; Liebrucks, 2001; Matthews, 1998; McMullen, 1996; Parker, 1999; Terwee, 1995). Relativism has been variously castigated as: a type of intellectual mischief which presents a special dilemma (Cerullo, 1992); paradoxical (Matthews, 1998); unintelligible (Greenwood, 1989); logically inconsistent (Foster, 1987); self-refuting (Harre, 1992; Kukla, 2000; Terwee, 1995), self-contradictory (Hailing & Lawrence, 1999; Maze, 2001), incoherent (Harre, 1992), and philosophically anarchistic (Harre & Krausz, 1996).
M3 - Chapter
SN - 978-0-387-22975-1
T3 - History and Philosophy of Psychology
SP - 29
EP - 54
BT - Unfolding social constructionism
A2 - Chung, Man Cheung
PB - Springer, Springer Nature
CY - New York, USA
ER -