Reliable and unreliable judgments about reasons

Caitrin Donovan, Cordelia Fine, Jeanette Kennett

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterResearchpeer-review

Abstract

The new skepticism about practical reason is predicated upon empirical findings which challenge the primacy traditionally afforded to reasoning in contexts of normative deliberation. These findings, which are associated with dual-process theories of cognition, are taken to support two skeptical claims: our reasons for action are not what we take them to be, and reasoning is an unreliable means for arriving at reliable judgments. After providing a critical overview of empirically based skepticism and its implications, we argue that skeptics underestimate the role that reasoning processes play in moral deliberation. We then canvass ways in which threats to the reliability of individual-level moral reasoning can be countenanced by social-level practices such as "nudging," inter-agent reasoning, and testimonial expertise.

LanguageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Oxford handbook of reasons and normativity
EditorsDaniel Star
Place of PublicationOxford, UK
PublisherOxford University Press
Chapter40
Pages939-963
Number of pages25
ISBN (Print)9780199657889
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 10 Jul 2018

Fingerprint

Skepticism
Dual Process Theory
Cognition
Moral Reasoning
Practical Reason
Expertise
Moral Deliberation
Deliberation
Threat
Reasons for Action
Skeptics
Primacy

Keywords

  • Deliberation
  • Haidt
  • Moral cognition
  • Normative judgments
  • Psychology
  • Reasoning
  • Reasons
  • Social intuitionism

Cite this

Donovan, C., Fine, C., & Kennett, J. (2018). Reliable and unreliable judgments about reasons. In D. Star (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of reasons and normativity (pp. 939-963). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.41
Donovan, Caitrin ; Fine, Cordelia ; Kennett, Jeanette. / Reliable and unreliable judgments about reasons. The Oxford handbook of reasons and normativity. editor / Daniel Star. Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press, 2018. pp. 939-963
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Donovan, C, Fine, C & Kennett, J 2018, Reliable and unreliable judgments about reasons. in D Star (ed.), The Oxford handbook of reasons and normativity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp. 939-963. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.41

Reliable and unreliable judgments about reasons. / Donovan, Caitrin; Fine, Cordelia; Kennett, Jeanette.

The Oxford handbook of reasons and normativity. ed. / Daniel Star. Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press, 2018. p. 939-963.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterResearchpeer-review

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Donovan C, Fine C, Kennett J. Reliable and unreliable judgments about reasons. In Star D, editor, The Oxford handbook of reasons and normativity. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 2018. p. 939-963 https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.41