Representation wars: enacting an armistice through active inference

Axel Constant*, Andy Clark, Karl J. Friston

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

26 Citations (Scopus)
23 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Over the last 30 years, representationalist and dynamicist positions in the philosophy of cognitive science have argued over whether neurocognitive processes should be viewed as representational or not. Major scientific and technological developments over the years have furnished both parties with ever more sophisticated conceptual weaponry. In recent years, an enactive generalization of predictive processing – known as active inference – has been proposed as a unifying theory of brain functions. Since then, active inference has fueled both representationalist and dynamicist campaigns. However, we believe that when diving into the formal details of active inference, one should be able to find a solution to the war; if not a peace treaty, surely an armistice of a sort. Based on an analysis of these formal details, this paper shows how both representationalist and dynamicist sensibilities can peacefully coexist within the new territory of active inference.

Original languageEnglish
Article number598733
Pages (from-to)1-14
Number of pages14
JournalFrontiers in Psychology
Volume11
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 7 Jan 2021

Bibliographical note

Copyright the Author(s) 2021. Version archived for private and non-commercial use with the permission of the author/s and according to publisher conditions. For further rights please contact the publisher.

Keywords

  • active inference
  • embodiment
  • free energy principle
  • philosophy of cognitive science
  • representationalism

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Representation wars: enacting an armistice through active inference'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this