Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

62 Citations (Scopus)


In this article it is argued that the standard theoretical account of risk in the contemporary literature, which is cast along probabilistic lines, is flawed, in that it is unable to account for a particular kind of risk. In its place a modal account of risk is offered. Two applications of the modal account of risk are then explored. First, to epistemology, via the defence of an anti-risk condition on knowledge in place of the normal anti-luck condition. Second, to legal theory, where it is shown that this account of risk can cast light on the debate regarding the extent to which a criminal justice system can countenance the possibility of wrongful convictions.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)436-461
Number of pages26
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2015
Externally publishedYes


  • epistemology
  • evidence
  • knowledge
  • luck
  • philosophy of law
  • risk


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