Rule-following and externalism

Alexander Miller

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

John McDowell has suggested recently that there is a route from his favoured solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's "sceptical paradox" about rule-following to a particular form of cognitive externalism. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case: even granting McDowell his solution to the rule-following paradox, his preferred version of cognitive externalism does not follow.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)127-140
Number of pages14
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume68
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2004

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