Rule-following and externalism

Alexander Miller

doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00329.x

Rule-following and externalism

Alexander Miller

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

John McDowell has suggested recently that there is a route from his favoured solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's "sceptical paradox" about rule-following to a particular form of cognitive externalism. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case: even granting McDowell his solution to the rule-following paradox, his preferred version of cognitive externalism does not follow.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	127-140
Number of pages	14
Journal	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume	68
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00329.x
Publication status	Published - 2004

Access to Document

10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00329.x

Cite this

@article{f4f90187f9c347608701989b1bf41349,

title = "Rule-following and externalism",

abstract = "John McDowell has suggested recently that there is a route from his favoured solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's {"}sceptical paradox{"} about rule-following to a particular form of cognitive externalism. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case: even granting McDowell his solution to the rule-following paradox, his preferred version of cognitive externalism does not follow.",

author = "Alexander Miller",

year = "2004",

doi = "10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00329.x",

language = "English",

volume = "68",

pages = "127--140",

journal = "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research",

issn = "0031-8205",

publisher = "John Wiley \& Sons",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Rule-following and externalism

AU - Miller, Alexander

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

N2 - John McDowell has suggested recently that there is a route from his favoured solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's "sceptical paradox" about rule-following to a particular form of cognitive externalism. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case: even granting McDowell his solution to the rule-following paradox, his preferred version of cognitive externalism does not follow.

AB - John McDowell has suggested recently that there is a route from his favoured solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's "sceptical paradox" about rule-following to a particular form of cognitive externalism. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case: even granting McDowell his solution to the rule-following paradox, his preferred version of cognitive externalism does not follow.

U2 - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00329.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00329.x

M3 - Article

SN - 0031-8205

VL - 68

SP - 127

EP - 140

JO - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

JF - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

IS - 1

ER -

Rule-following and externalism

Abstract

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this