Russian active measures in the 2016 US presidential election: 'useful idiots' and intelligence agencies

Allon J. Uhlmann, Stephen McCombie

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The 2016 US presidential election saw a two-pronged Russian interference operation. Russia’s intelligence agencies sought to compromise both campaigns – Trump’s through highly publicized direct engagement, Clinton’s through leaking compromising information. In parallel, a non-state outfit, the Internet Research Agency (IRA), sought to exacerbate conflict and strife through a destabilizing social media campaign. The authors’ earlier findings indicate the IRA’s actual effect on the election outcomes was minimal. In fact, they argue, the campaign aimed to drive disaffection and diminish trust in the US electoral system overall, rather than help Trump win. Nonetheless, the perceived effectiveness of Russia’s interference allowed the Kremlin – through deft media engagement – to exploit the shock result to exaggerate the apparent effect of its intervention and delegitimize Trump’s victory. Moscow succeeded in degrading Washington’s strategic coherence by driving a wedge between the White House and US intelligence community. Russia’s emerging division of labor between government and private agencies is instructive. The complex and sensitive task of hacking high-value targets was executed by government agencies. The technically simple yet labor-intensive online campaign was outsourced to the IRA. This gave the Kremlin a measure of deniability and allowed it to quickly recruit and deploy extra resources for the campaign.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationRoutledge handbook of the influence industry
EditorsEmma L. Briant, Vian Bakir
Place of PublicationLondon ; New York
PublisherRoutledge, Taylor and Francis Group
Chapter9
Pages134-144
Number of pages11
ISBN (Electronic)9781003256878, 9781040121931
ISBN (Print)9781032188997, 9781032189000
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2025
Externally publishedYes

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