Scepticism and epistemic value. Radical scepticism, epistemic luck, and epistemic value

I - Duncan Pritchard

Duncan Pritchard*, Martijn Blaauw

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

It is argued that it is beneficial to view the debate regarding radical scepticism through the lens of epistemic value. In particular, it is claimed that we should regard radical scepticism as aiming to deprive us of an epistemic standing that is of special value to us, and that this methodological constraint on our dealings with radical scepticism potentially has important ramifications for how we assess the success of an anti-sceptical strategy.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)19-41
Number of pages23
JournalProceedings of the Aristotelean Society, Supplementary Volumes
Volume82
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2008
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Scepticism and epistemic value. Radical scepticism, epistemic luck, and epistemic value: I - Duncan Pritchard'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this