Selfish random access: equilibrium conditions and best-response learning

Hazer Inaltekin; Mung Chiang; Harold Vincent Poor

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_12

Selfish random access

equilibrium conditions and best-response learning

Hazer Inaltekin^*, Mung Chiang, Harold Vincent Poor

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference proceeding contribution

Abstract

This paper studies a class of random access games for wireless channels with multipacket reception. First, necessary and sufficient equilibrium conditions for a contention strategy profile to be a Nash equilibrium for general wireless channels are established. Then, applications of these equilibrium conditions for well-known channel models are illustrated. Various engineering insights and design ideas are provided. Finally, the results are extended to an incomplete information game setting, and best-response learning dynamics leading to Nash equilibria are investigated.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Game theory for networks
Subtitle of host publication	Second International ICST Conference GAMENETS 2011 Shanghai, China, April 16–18, 2011 revised selected papers
Editors	Rahul Jain, Rajgopal Kannan
Place of Publication	Berlin
Publisher	Springer, Springer Nature
Pages	169-181
Number of pages	13
ISBN (Electronic)	9783642303739
ISBN (Print)	9783642303722
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_12
Publication status	Published - 2012
Externally published	Yes
Event	2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory in Networks, GAMENETS 2011 - Shanghai, China Duration: 16 Apr 2011 → 18 Apr 2011

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
Publisher	Springer
Volume	75
ISSN (Print)	1867-8211
ISSN (Electronic)	1867-822X

Conference

Conference	2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory in Networks, GAMENETS 2011
Country	China
City	Shanghai
Period	16/04/11 → 18/04/11

Keywords

Slotted ALOHA
multipacket reception
game theory
contention control
medium access control

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_12

Link to publication in Scopus

Cite this

Inaltekin, H., Chiang, M., & Poor, H. V. (2012). Selfish random access: equilibrium conditions and best-response learning. In R. Jain, & R. Kannan (Eds.), Game theory for networks: Second International ICST Conference GAMENETS 2011 Shanghai, China, April 16–18, 2011 revised selected papers (pp. 169-181). (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering; Vol. 75). Berlin: Springer, Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_12

Inaltekin, Hazer ; Chiang, Mung ; Poor, Harold Vincent. / Selfish random access : equilibrium conditions and best-response learning. Game theory for networks: Second International ICST Conference GAMENETS 2011 Shanghai, China, April 16–18, 2011 revised selected papers. editor / Rahul Jain ; Rajgopal Kannan. Berlin : Springer, Springer Nature, 2012. pp. 169-181 (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering).

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Inaltekin, H, Chiang, M & Poor, HV 2012, Selfish random access: equilibrium conditions and best-response learning. in R Jain & R Kannan (eds), Game theory for networks: Second International ICST Conference GAMENETS 2011 Shanghai, China, April 16–18, 2011 revised selected papers. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol. 75, Springer, Springer Nature, Berlin, pp. 169-181, 2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory in Networks, GAMENETS 2011, Shanghai, China, 16/04/11. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_12

Selfish random access : equilibrium conditions and best-response learning. / Inaltekin, Hazer; Chiang, Mung; Poor, Harold Vincent.

Game theory for networks: Second International ICST Conference GAMENETS 2011 Shanghai, China, April 16–18, 2011 revised selected papers. ed. / Rahul Jain; Rajgopal Kannan. Berlin : Springer, Springer Nature, 2012. p. 169-181 (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering; Vol. 75).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference proceeding contribution

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AB - This paper studies a class of random access games for wireless channels with multipacket reception. First, necessary and sufficient equilibrium conditions for a contention strategy profile to be a Nash equilibrium for general wireless channels are established. Then, applications of these equilibrium conditions for well-known channel models are illustrated. Various engineering insights and design ideas are provided. Finally, the results are extended to an incomplete information game setting, and best-response learning dynamics leading to Nash equilibria are investigated.

KW - Slotted ALOHA

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KW - contention control

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Inaltekin H, Chiang M, Poor HV. Selfish random access: equilibrium conditions and best-response learning. In Jain R, Kannan R, editors, Game theory for networks: Second International ICST Conference GAMENETS 2011 Shanghai, China, April 16–18, 2011 revised selected papers. Berlin: Springer, Springer Nature. 2012. p. 169-181. (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_12