Selfish random access

equilibrium conditions and best-response learning

Hazer Inaltekin*, Mung Chiang, Harold Vincent Poor

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference proceeding contribution

Abstract

This paper studies a class of random access games for wireless channels with multipacket reception. First, necessary and sufficient equilibrium conditions for a contention strategy profile to be a Nash equilibrium for general wireless channels are established. Then, applications of these equilibrium conditions for well-known channel models are illustrated. Various engineering insights and design ideas are provided. Finally, the results are extended to an incomplete information game setting, and best-response learning dynamics leading to Nash equilibria are investigated.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationGame theory for networks
Subtitle of host publicationSecond International ICST Conference GAMENETS 2011 Shanghai, China, April 16–18, 2011 revised selected papers
EditorsRahul Jain, Rajgopal Kannan
Place of PublicationBerlin
PublisherSpringer, Springer Nature
Pages169-181
Number of pages13
ISBN (Electronic)9783642303739
ISBN (Print)9783642303722
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes
Event2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory in Networks, GAMENETS 2011 - Shanghai, China
Duration: 16 Apr 201118 Apr 2011

Publication series

NameLecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
PublisherSpringer
Volume75
ISSN (Print)1867-8211
ISSN (Electronic)1867-822X

Conference

Conference2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory in Networks, GAMENETS 2011
CountryChina
CityShanghai
Period16/04/1118/04/11

Keywords

  • Slotted ALOHA
  • multipacket reception
  • game theory
  • contention control
  • medium access control

Cite this